

3 August 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR:

STAT

1. The two problems of intelligence concern which I mentioned to you on Friday were not resolved at Planning Board. Hence DCI will have to be clued in on them prior to NSC, via a briefing memorandum in his book.

2. Ergo, I would like two memoranda from you bearing on the points at issue:

a. I inserted two sentences just before Paragraph 17 of the French paper stating that:

"Furthermore, France's own planning for modernization of its forces appears to be aimed more toward what it conceive to be its own national needs than toward meeting NATO requirements. De Gaulle seems primarily interested in achieving self-sufficient national forces oriented toward both the European and global interests of France.

Among other things, France appears..."

The JCS man said that neither G-2 nor J-2 could understand what this was all about and was totally unmoved by my citation of the Weekly article and my pointing out the numerous ways in which French military thinking was divergent from ours. In fact, I pointed out, that the immediately following paragraph on France's determination to have an "independent nuclear capability, including its own strategic delivery systems" was the big single piece of evidence that your article was correct. Since the two sentences which I inserted above were taken almost verbatim from your Weekly article of 23 July I feel that we need from you a one-two page memorandum telling the facts (with citations) which support the thrust of the Weekly. The materials Shumate sent me don't do the job well enough.

b. I also ran into difficulty with the footnote on the cost of the Constantine Plan. This time Defense wanted to add to the first sentence that the 850,000-1,000,000,000 annually on the French military effort in Algeria was "above and beyond normal expenditures". The Defense figures on which their statement is based are attached. State and I could not buy this pointing out that the last "normal" year was 1954 and that it was hardly sensible to talk about normal years like that. State also questioned the Defense rate. Defense furthermore went on to argue that only "some" of the outlays would continue after hostilities ended rather than "much of the outlays". Your memorandum to me of 15 July estimated that there would be very little direct saving and I would like a memorandum supporting the wording of the footnote as submitted by us and attacking the Defense reservations.

3. The obvious thrust of the Defense, etc. reservations above is to support the thesis that if only Algerian hostilities could be ended the French could finance most if not all of their own military programs. For many reasons I think that this is theoretical nonsense. But our job is merely to see that the judgments in the paper are sound from an intelligence point of view. We will have to make clear to DCI what the issue here is, so please let me have two memos on the above subject by close of business Thursday, 6 August.

R. W. KIMER